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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNN) have shown great
success in many computer vision applications. However, they are
also known to be susceptible to backdoor attacks, where the
misclassification behaviors are hidden in a normal DNN model,
but can be triggered by a specific pattern. When conducting
backdoor attacks, most of the existing approaches assume that
the targeted DNN is always available, and an attacker can always
inject a specific pattern to the training data to further fine-tune
the DNN model. As such, a testing input with the specific pattern
will be misclassified by the targeted DNN model. However, in
practice, such attack may not be feasible as the DNN model is
encrypted and only available to the secure enclave.
In this paper, we propose a novel black-box backdoor attack
technique on face recognition systems, which can be conducted
without the knowledge of the targeted DNN model. To be specific,
motivated by the recent advance of DNN interpretation that DNN
explores common knowledge such as edge and color, we propose
a backdoor attack with a novel color stripe pattern trigger,
which can be generated by modulating LED in a specialized
waveform. We also use an evolutionary computing strategy to
optimize the waveform for backdoor attack. Our backdoor attack
can be conducted in a very mild condition: 1) the adversary
cannot manipulate the input in an unnatural way (e.g., injecting
adversarial noise); 2) the adversary cannot access the training
database; 3) the adversary has no knowledge of the training
model as well as the training set used by the victim party. We
show that the backdoor trigger can be quite effective, where the
attack success rate can be up to 88% based on our simulation
study and up to 40% based on our physical-domain study by
considering the task of face recognition and verification based
on at most three-time attempts during authentication. Finally,
we evaluate several state-of-the-art potential defenses towards
backdoor attacks, and find that our attack can still be effective.
We highlight that our study revealed a new physical backdoor
attack, which calls for the attention of the security issue of the
existing face recognition/verification techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved de-
sired performance on many computer vision tasks [1], [2], [3],
[4]. However, despite the popularity of the DNN in different
types of applications, there is growing concerns regarding the
security issue of the DNN [5]. Part of the threat comes from
the backdoor attack [6], which allows the input instance with
a special designed trigger predicted as the target chosen by
an adversary. For example, by injecting an eyeglasses-shape
trigger into the face recognition system, an adversary can
mislead the recognition system as another one to get into a
system that he cannot access originally [7].
∗ Equal Contribution
A fundamental problem for backdoor attacks against DNN
is how to inject a suitable trigger, which can effectively
activate a malicious behavior by recognizing one input as
the targeted on chosen by the attacker. Recent works in the
security community have made progresses on improving either
the stealthiness [7] or the transferability [8] of the backdoor
trigger, and have shown to be effective to achieve stable attack
success rate on different types of applications (e.g., face/iris
recognition, traffic sign recognition [8]). However, to the best
of our knowledge, the existing works mainly relied on the
assumptions that an adversary has full knowledge of the model
details, the training mechanism (e.g., [8], [9], [10]), or an
adversary could directly inject the backdoor trigger (e.g., the
poisoning data) into the training data (e.g.,[7]).
In practice, the aforementioned assumptions may not always
hold. For example, due to the security and privacy issue in
the field of machine learning, the privacy of user’s training
data will be protected via some database security techniques
[11]. It is difficult for an outsider (or even an insider) to
inject any data into the training data. Furthermore, it is also
difficult to calculate the accurate trigger for a specific target,
as an adversary may not be able to have the full knowledge
of the training mechanism which is usually performed within
the secure enclave. Last but not the least, even an adversary
has the full knowledge of training mechanism and can inject
any data into the training data, existing works still use an
unnatural pattern (e.g., adversarial noise [8], [9]) to construct
the the backdoor trigger, which further raises the bar for the
adversary to conduct backdoor attacks in physical domain.
In this paper, we propose to explore the possibility of
conducting practical DNN backdoor attacks in a black-box
manner without the knowledge of DNN model. In particular,
we focus on the task of face recognition and verification.
To launch a practical black-box attack, there are two key
challenges: ¶ how to find an effective and natural trigger
without the knowledge of DNN model and · how to inject the
trigger without the access of the database and further conduct
the backdoor attack in the physical domain.
To tackle the challenge ¶, we aim to find a trigger that
could be easily generated in physical domain (i.e., natural)
and further achieve high backdoor attack (i.e., effective). Al-
though the DNN model is known to be lack-of-interpretability,
researchers have put tremendous efforts to understand how
the DNN model works. Our motivation comes from the DNN
interpretation on image recognition[12], [13], i.e., through
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visulization of its convolutional layer [14], especially the
shallow layers of DNN as they aim to explore the common
knowledge among various computer vision tasks. Based on
this, for instance, customers can take the public DNN model
(e.g., ResNet101 [3]) which is pretrained on a large-scale
dataset (e.g., ImageNet [15]) and further customize the model
with local data on another task (e.g., face recognition [16])
through transfer learning. Despite that the tasks are different,
the common knowledge (e.g., edge and color) can be shared.
To this end, we propose to adopt the common knowledge
(i.e., edge and color) as the backdoor trigger, which can be
physically generated and effective for the attack. The key idea
is to illuminate the environment by using smart light emitting
diode (LED) bulbs with an intensity-modulated waveform
[17] which is not noticeable by human. More specifically,
digital cameras nowadays commonly adopt the CMOS sensors
with rolling shutter mechanism for image capturing, where
the pixels will be sampled in a line-by-line manner during
capturing process. Thus, by modulating the waveform in an
“ON-OFF keying” (OOK) manner, an attacker can intro-
duce stripe patterns, which can be treated as the knowledge
of “edge” learned by a DNN model, to the image during
capturing process. Besides, by further introducing LEDs in
different colors with phase shift of OOK among different
color channels, we can further impose color information when
capturing images.
Typically, a face recognition/verification process consists
of the stage of registration and authentication. To tackle the
challenge ·, we propose that the attacker could deploy the
modified LEDs in advance such that the images captured under
the LEDs (i.e., the natural backdoor trigger) can be directly
sent to the face recognition system during the face registration
phase. Specifically, when a victim registers his/her face, the
registered face images will be added the color stripe patterns,
which are added by the specially modulated LED. Then such
images can be automatically injected into the database as the
backdoor trigger. Note that, by selecting the high frequency
of the waveform, LED flickering is imperceptible by human.
The backdoor attack can be further conducted, i.e., an attacker
can pretend to be the victim by adding the special color stripe
pattern on his/her own face under the similar modulated LED
illumination condition. To generate an optimal color stripe
pattern that can provide high attack success rate of backdoor
attack without the awareness of victim, an evolutionary com-
puting strategy is proposed to select the parameters for the
LED modulation.
We evaluate our proposed attack based on both software
simulation as well as physical-domain evaluation. Regarding
the software simulation, we conduct extensive experiments
on advanced DNN model “VGGFace” [16] on two different
benchmark datasets “PubFig” and “YouTube Face” for face
recognition task, and “SphereFace” model [18] on LFW
dataset [19] for face verification task. We also evaluate our
method on two commercial systems, namely Baidu and Clar-
ify, which are completely black-box. Regarding the evaluation
on physical domain, we conduct hardware implementation in
real-world conditions by evaluating on two flagship mobile
phones, Samsung Galaxy 10 and Huawei Mate Pro30. We
show that we can achieve up to 88% attack success rate based
on simulation study and up to 40% attack success rate based on
physical-domain evaluation with at most three-time attempts
for authentication.
We finally study different defense methods which are re-
ported promising for backdoor attack in the community of
computer vision, including neural cleanse [20] and l∞-based
network pruning [21], as well as the image denoising method
by assuming we have the prior knowledge of trigger pattern
[22]. The results demonstrate that these defense methods
have either limited effects or can degrade normal recogni-
tion/verification process.
Our study reveals the security weakness of DNN based
face recognition system based on camera’s CMOS sensor
for image capturing. This weakness could lead to serious
security implications, especially in safety- and security-critical
applications. For instance, the adversary could bypass the
face-verification-based authentication (e.g., financial transac-
tion [23]). Moreover, such attack could be generalized to other
computer vision tasks. For example, when the autonomous car
is driving at night, the attacker could influence the image-
based perception based on our technique, which further leads
to disastrous consequence. Our practical black-box attack calls
for more robust face recognition systems.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a novel backdoor attack by illuminating the
environment with modulated LED waveform. Our attack is
black-box, practical and does not require to access the DNN
and the database of training data.
• We develop a simple but effective implementation based
on both software and hardware to launch such attack. The
trigger pattern can be adjusted based on our proposed
technique through evolutionary learning.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our backdoor attack
on open-source models and two commercial systems. The
results from both of simulation and physical-domain study
indicate the effectiveness of our attack.
• We evaluate the existing defense methods on our attack and
discuss their limitations, which calls for more robust face
recognition system and more effective defense techniques.
II. BACKGROUNDS
A. Deep Neural Networks and Face Recognition
A DNN [1] can be represented as a function F by mapping
the input data {x : x ∈ X, x ∈ Rn} to the output label space
{y : y ∈ Y}, where n is the dimension of x. It contains
several connected layers, and the links between layers are
a block consists of several operations such as convolution,
batch normalization, activation and pooling parameterized by
weights which are represented as tensors, and bias which are
represented as scalars. The goal during the training phase is
to find the optimal parameters of the DNN by providing a
large set of known input-output pairs and to minimize a cost
function J(F (X),Y) to update the parameters through back
propagation. During testing phase, given an unlabeled data xu,
we assign the label as argminiFi(xu), where Fi(xu) denotes
the probability that xu belongs to class i.
Face recognition aims to identify or verify a person’s iden-
tity from a digital image or a video frame from a video source.
Due to the breakthrough of deep learning, we have witnessed
a lot of progresses on face recognition technology [24], [25]
(even under the case where face images are corrupted (e.g.
[26]), which have been successfully deployed for different
applications, e.g., mobile phone unlocking [27], [28], online
transaction through mobile banking apps [23]. In practice,
when building a DNN from scratch for face recognition
purpose, one can adopt the same DNN training strategy as
discussed above to train a DNN model. When the DNN
model is deployed into practical application, one may assign
the face identity as argminiFi(x), where Fi(x) denotes the
probability that x belongs to identity i. Another strategy is
to conduct latent feature comparison. by matching the face
for verification purpose. The identity will be selected where
the feature distance between the client and the corresponding
identity is the closest.
B. Backdoor Attacks of DNN
Backdoor usually refers to a piece of malicious code or
program [29]. The software or system behave normally on
clean inputs and only behave wrongly under certain malicious
input. Similarly, one can also treat the deployed DNN as
a software. An attacker can inject the malicious behavior
to the DNN, which can be done by injecting some specific
backdoors to the database, which will be further adopted as
part of training samples. The injected backdoor will not affect
the DNN’s behaviors given normal input data, but can lead
the DNN to produce unexpected behaviors if some specific
patterns (a.k.a. triggers) are added to the input. The key steps
of the backdoor attack include generating effective triggers and
injecting them into the target system, such that the backdoor
could be leveraged later.
Backdoor attacks of DNN systems have attract a lot of
attentions recently due to the wide-spread deployment of
DNN. One stream is to poison the data by changing the
corresponding label to the target class. For example, Gu et
al. [6] proposed BadNets to inject a backdoor by poisoning
the training data. In [9], a trojaning mechanism was proposed
where an attacker first generates an image-patch labeled with a
specific backdoor (a.k.a. trojan trigger) by reverse-engineering
the DNN model. The model is then re-trained with benign
samples as well as trojan triggers to obtain a trained DNN
with trojaned behaviors. The DNN can be bypassed with
other images with the trigger. To improve the vulnerability
of DNN to backdoor attacks through transfer learning, Yao
et al. [8] proposed a backdoor attack strategy on DNN by
matching the latent feature of a poisoning sample and a
targeted sample, such that the trigger can be generated without
being influenced by DNN fine-tuning. In [7], a backdoor attack
strategy was proposed to circumvent face recognition DNN
Fig. 1. The principle of electronic rolling shutter.
model by assuming that the attacker cannot access the details
of DNN and training set. However, it is also assumed that
an attacker can inject the poissoning sample with a specific
hand-crafted pattern to the training set, which can usually be
realized through insider attack. Another stream is to inject
the trigger to the data without altering the label, which is
known as clean-label backdoor attack. For example, Turner et
al. [30] proposed to plant backdoor with adversarial examples
and GAN-generated data. Barni et al. [31] proposed to utilize
sinusoidal wave signal in a column-wise manner as trigger.
More recently, Liu et al. [10] proposed to generated reflection
pattern on images such that the poisoning samples can appear
to be more natural.
Due to the severe security issue of backdoor attack, there
also exist defense technologies against backdoors. Chen et al.
[32] proposed to find backdoors through active clustering by
assuming that the latent codes of backdoor triggers and benign
inputs are different. Liu et al. [33] proposed to defense the
DNN through pruning strategies by removing neurons which
are less likely to contribute to classification. Wang et al. [20]
proposed Neural Cleanse to detect backdoors by finding any
potential hidden triggers through reverse-engineering. More
recently, an l∞ norm based network pruning strategy was
proposed in [21]. But the aforementioned techniques assumes
that either DNN model or training data are available. In [7],
the authors proposed three different types of defense strate-
gies based on face recognition system, including backdoors
detection through label distribution, detection by treating the
backdoors as outliers, and defense with auxiliary pristine data,
but found none of them effective under this scenario.
C. Rolling Shutter and ON-OFF Keying
Rolling shutter is a mechanism of image capturing which
is widely used in mobile phone cameras, web camera, etc.
In order to reduce the capturing cost (e.g., cashing, power
consumption), the rolling shutter image sensor only exposes a
scanline (i.e., a row or a column) of pixels in the image sensor.
To be specific, the scanlines of pixels in the image sensor are
reset in sequence. The time delay between a scanline being
reset and a scanline being read is referred as the integration
time (visualized as blue bar in Fig. 1). When this reset process
has moved some distance along the image, the readout process
(visualized as yellow bar in Fig. 1) begins in the same manner
and at the same speed as the reset process.
In ON-OFF Keying (OOK) modulation, ON and OFF states
are used to represent the state of LED light. By modulating a
LED flickering in an OOK manner, we expect that a camera
can produce an image with alternating bands of pixels with
bright and dark periodically.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ATTACK DESIGN
A. Threat Model and Scenario
We focus on clean-label attack in our paper. The goal of the
attacker is to conduct backdoor attack against a specific class
yt with only a DNN model/API available. The attacker aims
to inject poisoning samples targeting on yt into the system.
Such backdoor will not bring negative impact to the normal
face recognition or verification purpose, but can mislead the
DNN to predict all the inputs associated with the backdoor
as target label yt. We introduce our threat model below and
also list the differences of the threat model in Table I between
previous techniques and ours.
• Poisoning Samples Generation and Injection. Existing
works [9], [7], [8], [10] proposed to manipulate the inputs in
a specific way (e.g., adding the adversarial noise, poisoning
the corresponding label) and assume these poisoning sam-
ples can be injected into the training database. However,
it requires strong adversary and threat model where the
adversary can inject the data (e.g., though the system admin
privileges). We assume that an adversary cannot access the
database for DNN model training (i.e., not all manipulated
inputs could be injected). Unlike the aforementioned tech-
niques, we assume the poisoning samples can only be gen-
erated in a practical way, i.e., when the victim is registering
the face under the illuminated condition by modulating LED
in a specialized waveform. The assumption is reasonable
since the current face recognition systems usually contain
the face registration component, which provides us a more
practical way to inject such poisoning samples (i.e., the
registered face) into the system. For instance, the adversary
could deploy the LEDs in advance (e.g., in the office) and
induce the victim to register the face under the controlled
environment by modulating LED waveform. In this way,
our attack does not rely on neither data manipulation in an
unnatural way nor manually data injection (e.g., via system
admin privileges), which makes our attack much easier to
be conducted in the physical domain.
• Knowledge of DNN. We assume that an adversary has no
knowledge of training model and training mechanism except
the hard-label prediction by queering the target model. In
other words, the backdoor attack should be conducted in a
decision-based “black-box” manner, which is more realistic.
• Backdoor Instance Generation. We assume the attacker
can generate backdoor instances under the controlled envi-
ronment after the injection of poisoning samples. As such,
the attacker can mislead the DNN to predict the attacker
as the targeted victim. The assumption is feasible as the
attacker can easily create a similar environment (i.e., the
environment under the controlled light) for backdoor attack.
We consider two scenarios when conducting backdoor at-
tack. First, we assume that DNN model can be re-trained by
the administration side when poisoning samples are injected
(a) AlexNet on PubFig dataset (b) ResNet50 on VGG dataset
Fig. 2. Conv1 filter visualization based on face recognition task.
into the system. Such assumption is reasonable as it is quite
common that a DNN model will keep being updated when
a new category is identified, which matches the scenario of
face recognition [25]. We also consider another scenario that
the DNN model cannot be further updated, as it can be
encrypted on the chip for deployment purpose [34]. Such
scenario matches the application of face verification, where
one can purchase a trained model/API for deployment purpose.
B. Attacking Design
To design a suitable backdoor trigger against DNN model
in a black-box setting, we first need to understand what
information does a DNN model usually learn such that we
can select a more practical way to generate the poisoning
samples. To this end, we select two DNN models and fine-
tune the models on face recognition task. Specifically, two
different models are considered for visulization, AlexNet [2]
trained on PubFig dataset [35], and ResNet50 [3] trained on
VGG face dataset [16]. We conduct filter visualization of the
first Convolutional (Conv1) layer of trained DNN models. The
visulization results are shown in Fig. 2. As we can see, the
filters are dominated by the edge and color information, while
the others are noise patterns.
This finding motivates us to generate poisoning samples by
injecting the color stripe pattern as the trigger. By denoting
the victim’s clean face samples as xtc ∈ Xt with ground truth
labels as yt ∈ Yt, the poisoning samples can be generated as
xtb = xtc + ∆(ω), (1)
where ∆ is the color stripe pattern as trigger, ω is the
parameters for pattern generation. Different ω leads to different
styles of stripe patterns.
In face recognition task, the DNN model F needs to be
retrained. Specifically, F can be updated by the training pairs
{xtc, yt}, {xtb, yt} as well as other clean samples with their
corresponding labels. After training, an attacker can conduct
the backdoor attack by using his/her own captured face xa with
the stripe pattern ∆(ω), such that the input to the DNN model
is formulated as xa + ∆(ω), which is expected to mislead F
to produce wrong prediction as yt.
In face verification task, the DNN model can be directly
deployed without retraining. The model aims to extract the
face embedding given a registered face, which is denoted
TABLE I
SUMMARIZATION OF THREAT MODELS UNDER DIFFERENT BACKDOOR ATTACK METHODS.
Liu et al. [9] Yao et al. [8] Chen et al. [7] Barni et al. [31] Turner et al. [30] Liu et al. [10] Ours
Physically Generated No No No No No No Yes
Knowledge of DNN Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Label Poissoning Yes Yes Yes No No No No
as f(xtb). An attacker can conduct attack by adding the
stripe pattern in the input (i.e., xa + ∆(ω)), which further is
embedded as feature representation f(xa + ∆(ω)). We expect
the distance between f(xa + ∆(ω)) and f(xtb) can be small
enough such that the model can be bypassed.
As described in Section I, the key challenge is how to
manipulate the inputs in a practical way, i.e., how to add
the optimal stripe patterns in our attack. For example, if the
intensity of the stripe pattern is too high, the quality of face
images could be low, such that the face region may not be
detected. If the intensity is too low, the attack may also fail
as the stripe pattern has less effect on the DNN prediction.
To address this challenge, we model the stripe pattern by
identifying key factors which can influence the appearance
of stripe patterns. We then introduce to select an optimal LED
parameters by maximizing the face detection rate and attack
success rate through evolutionary computing. The details will
be introduced in the next section.
IV. APPROACH
A. Backdoor in Physical Domain
How human beings and camera models perceive the world
can be quite different. For human beings, the light enters
human being’s eyes through the cornea, then the lens focuses
light onto the retina which serves as a transducer for the
conversion of light into neuronal signals. However, camera
models capture vision by sampling the scene in a discrete
interval manner through CMOS sensor based on rolling shut-
ter mechanism. While the human flicker threshold (i.e., the
frequency that human eyes are not sensitive to) is usually
taken around 70 hertz (Hz) [36], camera models can easily
capture the flicker even in few kHz. Due to the rolling shutter
mechanism, the image captured by camera contains the mix of
bright and dark stripe patterns with different light intensities
in the same scene.
We propose to leverage the rolling shutter property to
generate stripe pattern trigger without affecting human vision,
which is, an attacker can conduct backdoor attack without the
awareness of victim. By modulating a smart LED to generate
high-frequency flickering pattern, the reflection intensity of
capturing environment also flickers by following the same
pattern as LED. In particular, we use the ON-OFF Keying
(OOK) modulation to generate such pattern. Due to the rolling
shutter mechanism, the rows/columns of pixels which are
exposed during ON period will become bright, while the
rows/columns of pixels exposed during OFF period will be
dark, which further leads to stripe pattern on the captured
face images. Meanwhile, as human eyes can only perceive
flicker lower than around 70 Hz, the backdoor attack will not
be noticeable by the victim.
B. Stripe Pattern Modeling
To find a suitable stripe pattern for the backdoor attack, we
first model the intensity, width and color of the pattern. As
CMOS sensor is scanned in a line-by-line manner, the light
accumulation at pixel j of the scanline i can be modeled as
Q(i, j) = αi,j
∫ ti+te
ti
pi(t)dt, where αi,j denotes the aggre-
gated path-loss of the environment at pixel (i, j), ti is the
starting time of exposure of scanline i and te is the exposure
time of CMOS sensor. pi(t) denotes the illumination intensity
function
pi(t) =
{
Ip + Ie 0 < t mod tl ≤ ton
Ie ton < t mod tl ≤ tl , (2)
where Ip denotes the peak intensity of the LED light source,
Ie denotes the illumination intensity of the environment, tl
denotes the period of the LED flickering, and ton denotes the
LED ON duration in a flickering cycle. The duty cycle is
modeled as tontl .
By further denoting ts as the CMOS sampling interval, we
can model the width of bright stripe widthB and dark stripe
widthD in terms of number of pixels, which can be given as
widthB = |(te mod tl)− ton|/ts, (3)
widthD = |(te mod tl)− (tl − ton)|/ts, (4)
Noted that if the LED is not flickering, the pixel intensity will
be Ip + Ie.
We further propose to introduce color information in the
stripe pattern. To this end, we extend OOK by adopting
color LEDs in red, green and blue light to modulate LED
waveforms in three color channels separately. Specifically,
we introduce three different flickering frequency components
based on R, G and B channel as fR, fG and fB , respectively.
We further introduce phase shift keying (PSK) mechanism
with the parameter φ(c1, c2), which represents the phase shift
of channel c2 relative to c1, where c1 and c2 denote two
different color channels. As there are three different channels
(i.e., R, G and B), by setting channel R as the reference, we
have two different parameters for the phase shift, denoting as
φ(R,G) and φ(R,B), such that the color information can be
introduced with R, G and B mixture.
As we aim to inject stripe patterns without the aware-
ness of victims, the luminaries should be consistent with-
out color flickering. According to the Bloch’s law [37],
the final perceived color can be formulated as Ip =
(
∫
Ip,rdt+
∫
Ip,gdt+
∫
Ip,bdt)/t, where t denotes the inter-
val of human perception, Ip,r, Ip,g and Ip,b denote the illumi-
nation intensity of red, green and blue LED light respectively.
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Fig. 3. Our proposed framework for DNN backdoor attack.
To this end, we modulate the LEDs in three different colors
with the same duty cycle based on the following reasons: 1) the
CMOS sensor can capture a variety of colors, which provides
more degrees of freedom for attacking, and 2) different color
channels with the same duty cycle makes the victim perceive
consistent color, such that the attack will not be noticeable.
In summary, the intensity, width and the color of stripe
patterns are determined by several factors which can be
controlled by the attacker, i.e., LED light flickering frequency
f = 1tl , the duty cycle τ , as well as the phase shifts
between two different channels. Noted that the exposure time
of camera and CMOS sampling interval also play an important
role for stripe pattern modeling, however, these two factors
are determined by the hardware of camera, which usually
cannot be controlled by the attacker. In our work, we consider
two different types of stripe patterns as the trigger, i.e., the
monochromatic stripe and color stripe. For the former one,
we adopt the same f and τ without phase shift for R, G and
B channel, where f = fR = fG = fB and the parameters can
be modeled as ω = [f, τ ]. For the latter one, the parameter can
be modeled as ω = [fR, fG, fB , τ, φ(R,G), φ(R,B)], where
fR, fG, fB denote the frequency of red, green and blue light
LED flickering, respectively, φ(R,G) and φ(R,B) denote the
phase shift between red/green channel and red/blue channel,
respectively. We model the stripe pattern in a column-wise
manner, which is quite common in the commercial off-the-
shelf camera models. We will also discuss the impact by
modeling the stripe row-by-row in the appendix section.
C. Workflow
We now introduce the proposed workflow to conduct back-
door attack of face recognition system, where the pipeline is
shown in Fig. 3. The workflow consists of two stages, 1) LED
light parameter selection, 2) backdoor trigger injection.
1) LED Parameter Selection: Intuitively, an attacker
may inject poisoning samples by varying the LED intensity
and flickering frequency to ensure the quality of backdoor
is high enough such that the face can be detected with high
attack success rate. However, as we have multiple parameters
involved, choosing suitable parameters may be difficult as it
can be time consuming. On the other hand, even the selected
parameters work well under one condition, it may not be able
to generalize to others. To this end, we propose a simple but
effective strategy based on evolutionary computing to set the
parameters in order to guarantee higher attack success rate
with satisfied capturing quality.
The main challenges of selecting an optimal setting may
come from several issues, including the diversity of environ-
ments (e.g., light conditions), face scale and poses, as well as
the adopted model and API. To mitigate the aforementioned
impacts, we propose to select the optimal setting based on
the training set of Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset
[19] which is a public benchmark for face verification task,
with face images collected under diverse conditions. Based
on Section IV.B, we can simulate the stripe pattern on face
images with the parameter ω, which has been introduced in
the previous section. We further denote a pair of face images
which belong to different identities as xtc,i and xa,j , which
refer to the clean face of victim i and the clean face of the
attacker j, respectively. By assuming that the attacker can
access the decision level of model or API (i.e., whether the
verification process is successful or not, which is reasonable
as accessing the decision level of API is still considered to be
black-box), the objective can be formulated as
max
ω
∑
i,j
δ[Ls(xtc,i + ∆(ω), xa,j + ∆(ω)),
Lq(xtc,i + ∆(ω)),Lq(xa,j + ∆(ω))]
s.t. f ≥ ft, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, (5)
where δ[cond1, cond2, cond3] returns 1 if all conditions are
true, otherwise returns 0. Ls and Lq denote the attack success
criterion and face image quality criterion, respectively, which
take the true value if the backdoor attack successes and the
face image quality meets the requirement. In practice, the face
image quality can be influenced by many factors. Usually,
a reliable quality can guarantee the success of face region
detection. To this end, we propose to measure the quality by
whether the face in the image can be detected by the state-
of-the-art face detection technique [38]. We also provide the
quality measurement results adopted by Baidu API in the
appendix based on our modeling. Besides, we introduce a
regularization term that the flickering frequency should be
greater than a threshold ft (i.e., f ≥ ft), such that the
backdoor attack can be conducted without the awareness of
the victim. As the parameters of the DNN model are not
accessible and the objective is non-differentiable, we propose
to leverage Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy
(CMA-ES) to find a suitable ω [39] for a specific victim.
Specifically, we adopt the pretrained SphereFace network [18]
as the DNN model. We empirically find that the parameters
obtained under such setting have good transferable capability
to other models/APIs. One may also consider to adopt two
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Fig. 4. (a) Simplified circuit diagram of LED. (b) and (c) Photo for the system
implementation, where we use auto-ISO setting of camera for capturing.
(Noted that (b) and (c) are captured under the same environmental condition.)
different ω1 and ω2 for victim and attacker, respectively.
However, we empirically find that such strategy may lead to
unstable training. Thus, we select the same ω in this work.
2) Backdoor Trigger Injection: The next step is to generate
the trigger pattern on face images. Based on the parameter
setting in Step 1, the attacker can launch a flickering LED
in a room where the victim is supposed to conduct the
face registration. The rest of the process happens on the
victim without any involvement from the attacker. Due to the
rolling shutter mechanism, the victim’s registered face will be
automatically added with the stripe patterns.
3) Backdoor Attack: After the backdoor trigger injection,
the attacker can use his/her own face under the same LED
light setting to bypass the face recognition/verification model.
D. System Design
We now introduce our implementation in physical domain.
The main idea is to generate the OOK waveform of each
color channel by a micro-controller unit (we use Arduino
nano) with a bluetooth module to remotely control the LED
for attacking purpose. To be specific, we use a constant
current LED driver in order to adapt our implementation to
a designated range of output voltages. The constant-current
buck regulator NCL30160 is selected on account of the high
rated current (1A) and wide dimming frequency range (0.1-
20khz). The rated current of each channel is 300mA and the
rated voltage is 13-15V for red LED and 18-20V for green
and blue LED, which leads to the total peak power around
20W. The simplified circuit diagram as well as the physical
implementation are shown in Fig. 4. It is worth noting that
the resistive load in the red channel is to reduce the voltage
drop, thereby reducing the electromagnetic interference caused
by the high switching frequency. We also introduce another
implementation based on household LED bulb, which is
presented in the appendix section.
V. EVALUATION METRICS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed attack frame-
work, we consider the following evaluation metrics, where the
non-victim success rate and victim success rate are adopted
to evaluate that our proposed attack will not affect normal
recognition/verification process. Face detection success rate is
adopted to measure the quality of face images. Attack success
rate is to measure the effectiveness of our proposed attack.
1) Non-victim test accuracy: Non-victim test accuracy is
computed based on face samples of non-victim without
stripe pattern trigger. We adopt this metric to verify whether
poisoning sample injection (for retraining) will influence
the overall performance of face recognition. We do not
report this metric for face verification task as we directly
adopt the deployed model without fine-tuning process.
2) Face detection success rate: We adopt the face detection
success rate, which is the percentage of number of success-
ful face region detection of poisoning samples, to evaluate
the quality of face images. Inserting stripe patterns can
have a negative impact to the quality of images, and face
detection algorithm may not be able to work properly when
the low quality face images are given. To trade off between
reliable image quality and the effectiveness of attack, we
aim to guarantee a high face detection success rate based
on poisoning samples.
3) Victim success rate: Injecting poisoning samples should
not affect the victim’s usage under normal light condi-
tion. We measure the success rate of the face recogni-
tion/verification system on the victims.
4) Attack success rate: We adopt attack success rate, which
is the percentage of the face images with triggers which are
classified as the target label, to evaluate the effectiveness
of our proposed attack framework.
VI. SIMULATION EVALUATION
We first evaluate our proposed attack based on simulation
evaluation under the task of face recognition and verification.
A. Setup
1) Face Recognition: We consider two benchmark datasets,
Public Figures Face Database (PubFig) [40] and Youtube
Aligned Face datasets [41], for evaluation. We model the
stripe patterns for attacking purpose based on Section IV.B to
simulate the scenario for backdoor trigger injection and attack.
We follow a similar dataset partition strategy proposed in
[7]. For PubFig dataset, we divide the dataset into three non-
overlapping sets: training set, testing set and attacker set. Note
that the training set and testing set are used to perform fine-
tuning and testing when new faces are registered, respectively.
The identity with less than 60 images are selected into the
attacker set. For the rest of each identity, we randomly select
60 samples, in which 40 samples as training samples and
20 samples as testing samples. Finally, we get 105 identities
for training and testing and 95 identities as attackers. For
Youtube Aligned Face dataset, the identity with fewer than 120
samples are used as attackers. For the remaining identities, we
randomly select 60 samples for each identity and divided them
into training set with 40 samples and testing set containing 20
samples. We finally get 1283 identities in training and testing
sets and 312 identities in the attacker set.
During the attack phase, we randomly select one identity
as the victim and choose 20 samples1 from the training data
1The impact of number of poisoning samples is discussed in the appendix.
belong to this identity for generating the poisoning samples.
Then we perform the backdoor attack with each attacker face
image from the attacker set (by adding the stripe pattern with
parameters obtained through evolutionary computing). Note
that, for each attacker face, we try at most three attempts (i.e.,
with three different stripe patterns by varying the waveform
phase of Channel R) which is a common practice as many
failed attempts are usually blocked by the face recognition
system. In addition, we measure the victim success rate and
non-victim success rate on the testing set of the victim identity
and non-victim identities, respectively.
We adopt VGGFace model [16], which was pre-trained on
a very large scale face dataset with 2.6M images and over
2.6K people. We further fine-tune the model on our adopted
datasets by replacing the last layer to a new one where the
layer dimension equals to the number of identities. As face
recognition usually consists of the face detection module, we
use the RetinaFace [42] for face detection.
2) Face Verification: We consider Labeled Faces in the
Wild Home (LFW) dataset [19]. The training data is binary
labeled with face images in pairs, where each pair may belong
to the same identify or different identities. For each pair, the
first face image is treated as the victim and we inject the stripe
pattern on it to generate the trigger. Then, if the second face
belongs to the same victim, we use it to calculate the victim
success rate. If the second face belongs to another identity, we
treat it as the attacker face and conduct the backdoor attack
by adding stripe pattern by varying the waveform phase of
Channel R with at most 3 attempts.
Noted that, unlike the face recognition, the face verification
model usually does not need to be fine-tuned in the real-world
application. We select one pre-trained model (i.e., SphereFace
net [9]) as well as two existing commercial systems (i.e.,
Clarify and Baidu) for the evaluation. We assume that only
the output of decision level of the model/API can be accessed.
Similar to face recognition task, we also use RetinaFace model
[42] for the face detection on SphereFace model. For Baidu
and Clarify, we use their built-in face detection modules. As
we only have face embedding when adopting Clarify, we
compute the similarity score based on cosine distance, which
is effective on the clean LFW dataset where we can achieve
0.9528 accuracy under FAR as 0.1%. For face verification
task, as a threshold must be determined based on a certain
false accept rate, we therefore choose the threshold at a false
accept rate of 0.1% based on clean data of LFW training set.
3) Parameters Optimization: To simulate the stripe pattern,
we set te = 1200s, which is a common setting for camera
devices to avoid overexposure [43], ts = 175000s which is
adopted by commercial-off-the-shelf mobile devices (e.g., in
Galaxy S10). As we aim to model the stripe pattern based
on the existing image, the additional illumination intensity
(for capturing new images) does not need to be considered.
Therefore, we set Ie = 0 with auto-ISO property through
intensity normalization [44] with Ip = 100.
Then we adopt the Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution
Strategy (CMA-ES) [39] to find the optimal LED parameter
setting for the backdoor attack. In particular, we conduct
the CMA-ES based on the training dataset of LFW dataset
[19] and SphereFace model [18] by setting ft = 100Hz
to avoid flickering of human vision. Based on the optimiza-
tion results, we have fR = fG = fB = 344.89Hz and
τ = 0.3865 for monochromatic stripe. For color stripe, we
have fR = 445.95Hz, fG = 232.30Hz, fB = 219.90Hz, τ =
0.2136, φ(R,G) = 0.2257TR, φ(R,B) = 0.7353TR, where
TR denotes the interval of channel R and TR = 1fR .
B. Results
We first evaluate our proposed method on the face recog-
nition task by considering both monochromatic stripe and
color stripe pattern as the trigger. In each experiment, we
randomly select one identity as the victim and use all images
of the attacker set to conduct the backdoor attack. We repeat
the experiment for 10 times and report the results based
on mean and standard deviation, which are shown in Table
II. As we can see, our proposed backdoor trigger has little
impact on the quality of face images, as a relatively high
face detection success rate can be guaranteed. On the other
hand, we observe that our proposed backdoor trigger will
not have negative impact to the normal recognition of victim
without LED light flickering, which indicates that the main
facial texture can still be preserved even the face images are
injected with stripe pattern. We observe that we can achieve
a satisfied attack success rate by both monochromatic stripe
as well as color stripe. Last but not the least, we observe
that a higher attack success rate can be achieved by adopting
color stripe as backdoor trigger, which is reasonable as color
information provides more degrees of freedom for attack and
can be captured by DNN model.
We then evaluate our proposed method on face verification
task based on the testing set of LFW. The results are shown
in Table III. We can draw a similar conclusion as the face
recognition task that our proposed backdoor trigger does not
have huge impact on the quality of face images and victim’s
verification without LED light flickering. Such observation is
reasonable as there are more parameters can be controlled
when using LEDs in different color. It is interesting to find
that while the detection performance on SphereFace model and
Clarify API are better on face images with monochromatic
stripe, such conclusion does not hold for Baidu API. We
conjecture the reason that Baidu API contains a more strict
face quality detection module. While the off-the-shelf face
detection algorithm can handle the face images with lower
quality, Baidu API only accepts very high quality face image
as input, and the face image quality with color stripe is better
compared with the image with monochromatic stripe. We also
observe that we can achieve a satisfied attack success rate by
both monochromatic stripe as well as color stripe generally,
and the performance of color stripe based attack is better
than the results based on monochromatic stripe. While the
stripe pattern is modeled based on LFW dataset on SphereFace
model, we find that a satisfied attack success rate can also be
achieved on the Baidu API and Clarify API, which shows
TABLE II
THE EVALUATION RESULTS OF FACE RECOGNITION.
non-victim test accuracy face detection success rate victim success rate attack success rate
PubFig Monochromatic stripe 0.9403±0.0021 0.9180±0.0024 0.920±0.0781 0.7659±0.0532Color stripe 0.9443±0.0012 0.9183±0.0041 0.975±0.0208 0.8856±0.0416
YouTube Face Monochromatic stripe 0.9864±0.0005 0.7377±0.0049 1.0000±0.0000 0.7292±0.0518Color stripe 0.9848±0.0003 0.7890±0.0085 1.0000±0.0000 0.8602±0.0402
∗ Noted that attacker success rate are obtained based on three-time attempts, while face detection success rate considers all attempts.
TABLE III
THE EVALUATION RESULTS OF FACE VERIFICATION
Monochromatic stripe Color stripe
Detection Victim Success Rate Attack Success Rate Detection Victim Success Rate Attack Success Rate
SphereFace 0.9640 0.9218 0.3411 0.9385 0.9173 0.8167
Baidu 0.8130 0.7464 0.1678 0.9515 0.9227 0.8811
Clarify 0.9820 0.9145 0.6533 0.8565 0.8436 0.8522
∗ Noted that attacker success rate are obtained based on three-time attempts, while face detection success rate considers all attempts.
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Fig. 5. Impact of LED frequency on attack success rate.
that our proposed attack could be transferable to the popular
commercial systems.
Noted that the LED parameters are selected based on
SphereFace model with LFW dataset. With the selected LED
parameters, we observe that the desired attack performance
can be achieved for both face recognition and verification
task on various models/APIs, which demonstrates the good
transferability of our proposed framework.
1) Impact of LED Frequency: To analyze the effectiveness
of our proposed attack framework, we conduct ablation study
on the face verification task by setting the LED parameters
fR = fG = fB as 50Hz, 60Hz, 110Hz, 220Hz, and 330Hz,
respectively. with duty cycle and phase shifts obtained by
evolutionary computing. The results are shown in Fig. 5. As
we can observe, the attack performance is not that desired
compared with the performance by selecting better parameters
using evolutionary computing, and the attack success rate can
be quite diverse based on different LED light settings. Such
observation demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed
attack framework to obtain suitable LED parameters. Never-
theless, we observe that a relatively high attack success rate
can still be achieved by setting the flickering frequency as
50Hz or 60Hz, which are the common alternating current
(AC) frequency. Such results further reveal the potential secu-
rity weakness of camera devices without aliasing module that
the attacker can even leverage fluorescent bulbs, which are
widely appeared in office environment, to conduct backdoor
attack of DNN model.
2) Impact of Waveform Duty Cycle: We then analyze the
impact of the duty cycle by fixing other parameters obtained
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Fig. 6. Impact of duty cycle on attack success rate. X axis denotes the
duty cycle. Left: monochromatic stripe. Right: color stripe. The dash line
corresponds to the value which is obtained through evolutionary computing.
through evolutionary computing. The results are shown in
Fig. 6. As we can observe, the attack performance degrades
when either duty cycle is too high or too low. We conjecture
several possible reasons: 1) the quality of face images could be
largely influenced, or 2) the intensity of added stripe patterns
is not strong enough, making it less effect on the DNN
prediction.
C. Discussion
In this section, we discuss some other issues which are
related with the attack performance but cannot be controlled by
the attacker. For clarity, we discuss our attack in the context
of face verification based on LFW dataset with pre-trained
SphereFace model [18], but it can be generalized to face
recognition task with other models/APIs.
1) Face Scale: Generally, the distance between the face and
the camera can be to some extent fixed, as the off-the-shelf
face recognition systems (e.g., Alipay) contain face collection
modules, which usually display the face contour on the screen
in order to detect the face with suitable size and acceptable
image quality. This module can guarantee that the face for
authentication purpose is in a proper distance to the camera
so that the size of the face is relatively fixed.
However, in some other cases where the face collection
module is not available, the scales of the faces can be different.
To this end, we aim to evaluate the performance of the
attack under the scenario where the face scales of attackers
and victims are different. In particular, we set the standard
(a) Monochromatic (b) Color
Fig. 7. The impact of face scale on attack success rate. The blue mesh reports
the false acceptance rate using the clean data on different scales, which is for
reference purpose.
TABLE IV
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.
Mono w/o Mono w Color w/o Color w
Attack Success Rate 0.3540 0.3752 0.8476 0.8552
aligned face size the same as the size in [18] and scale the
face by considering the factor ranging from 0.8 to 1.2. The
monochromatic and color stripe patterns are modeled based on
the same parameters, which is reasonable as the appearance
of stripe pattern only depends on the setting of the LED and
camera device. We show the results in Fig. 7. As we can see,
despite the mismatch of face scale, it still achieves better attack
success rate especially with color stripe patterns, which further
shows the robustness of our proposed attack mechanism.
On the other hand, we are also interested in the capturing
environmental condition, as smaller face scale can lead to
more background in the image. The stripe intensity in the
background region of the image can vary due to different
environment conditions as it can be illuminated by the reflected
light of modulated LED. To this end, we consider the case that
the detected face scale is relatively small with the factor as 0.8
and there is no reference object (e.g., wall) in the background
such that the stripe pattern only appears on foreground region
(i.e., face region) of the image. To simulate this condition, we
randomly pick up 15 face images belong to different identities
(which leads to 105 pairs in total) with the scale factor as 0.8
and manually conduct the background subtraction to remove
the stripe pattern in the background region. The results are
shown in Table IV, where “w/o” and “w” denote without and
with stripe pattern in the background, respectively. As we can
see, the environmental condition has little impact on the final
attack performance, where the attack success rates only drop
little by removing the stripe pattern in the background region.
Such results are reasonable as the verification process focus
more on the face region itself instead of the background.
2) Stripe Pattern Intensity: In practice, the intensity of
stripe pattern can be influenced by many factors, such as the
distance between LED and camera as well as the intensity of
ambient light. To this end, we vary the intensity of the stripe
pattern by further introducing the term Ie, which is to model
the intensity of environment as Ie = ratio ∗ Ip. We consider
the ratio ranging in [0, 1.4] with intensity normalization based
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Fig. 8. The impact of stripe depth on attack success rate. X axis and Y axis
denote the ratio of environment light intensity to LED intensity of victim and
attacker face images, respectively.
on the auto-ISO property [44]. The results are shown in Fig. 8.
As we can observe, the attack performance generally drops by
increasing Ie, which is reasonable as increasing Ie can lead to
lower stripe pattern intensity due to auto-ISO property that the
overall intensity of image will be adjusted with the variation
of ambient light.
3) Exposure Time: We empirically find that the contrast of
stripe pattern gets lower when increasing the exposure time te.
It is reasonable as longer exposure leads to more waveform
cycles, which may affect the appearance of the stripe pattern
by changing the intensity, width and colors. The quality of
captured photos may also be affected due to overexposure.
On the other hand, the intensity of the LED can also affect
the exposure time of cameras. Thus, we recommend to keep
a high intensity of LED light during attack, such that the
exposure time te is more likely to be set in a lower value that
further guarantees a higher attack success rate. In practice, we
find a relatively satisfied attack performance can be achieved
by using a 20W LED bulb in our setting by using mobile
phones with auto exposure, which will be discussed in the
next section.
VII. PHYSICAL-DOMAIN EVALUATION
We further evaluate our attack performance on commercial
products in the physical domain. To the best of our knowledge,
most of the commercial face systems mainly support face
verification, we thus consider the face verification task for the
physical-domain evaluation. In the physical implementation,
we set up the environment in an “easy office work” environ-
ment [45], where LEDs are modulated based on the parameters
obtained by evolutionary computing. We first discuss the stripe
pattern generated in physical domain. As we can observe in
Fig. 9, by using the white sheet curtain as background for
capturing, we find that the stripe pattern generated in physical
domain has little difference compared with the stripe pattern
generated through simulation in terms of color information as
well as the width of stripe, which shows the effectiveness of
our simulation modeling.
Next, we evaluate the performance in physical domain
based on the face verification task. We adopt two different
mobile devices, Samsung Galaxy S10 and Huawei Mate30Pro
(noted that we do not manually set the exposure time during
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9. Comparison of simulated stripes and real stripes. (a) Background.
(b) Simulated photo. (c) Real photo. Noted that the real photo captured by
Samsung Galaxy S10 under the setting in Section V.C.
capturing). We also invite five participants into our experiment,
which leads to 10 pairs in total for face verification. Similar
with the simulation, each participant is allowed with at most
3 attempts. The distance between LED and mobile phone
is roughly set as 0.5m to ensure a clear face image can
be captured while not affect human vision. Noted that our
implementation is different from the previous works [46],
[7], as we do not neither require specific crafted glasses nor
database access.
We empirically find that the face detection rate and the
victim success rate are all 100%, and the verification success
rate is 0% between two different identities in all scenarios in
our setting, which demonstrates the high quality of the selected
commercial systems. We also show the results in Fig. 10 by
considering both monochromatic and color stripe for attack
evaluation. As we can see, the attack success rate ranges from
10% to 40% while the victim success rate is still 100%. We can
see that the attack success rate is still desired as we conduct
attack in a totally black-box manner. However, we notice that
there is a large gap between the results in physical domain and
simulation study. Nevertheless, such observation is reasonable.
We conjecture several possible reasons and discuss below.
1) Covariate Shift: We modulate the waveform by using
the parameters obtained through evolutionary computing
on LFW dataset. However, there exists “covariate shift”
[47], [48] between LFW dataset and our own collected
data due to different facial appearances, light conditions,
etc. As such, the parameters obtained through evolutionary
computing may not be the optimal based on physical-
domain evaluation. Noted that how to address the problem
of covariate shift is still an open problem in the community
of machine learning. We will also investigate how to obtain
a more suitable parameters in our future work.
2) Noise: There exists unexpected noise (e.g., sensor noise)
when capturing images in physical domain, and such noise
can have huge negative impact to the performance of DNN
[49]. Thus, it is likely that such noise can also influence
the performance of our attack framework in the physical
domain. On the other hand, while LFW is also collected
by cameras. The noise pattern may not be the same due
to camera model mismatch, which can also lead to the
covariate shift problem. Moreover, we observe the perfor-
mance of different camera models can be different, which
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Fig. 10. Attack Success Rate in Physical Domain.
is reasonable as their capturing setting can be different.
3) Others: As we observe in Fig. 9, although two stripe
patterns are similar, the stripe locations of different colors
are different, and such mismatch may also influence the
performance. On the other hand, in some other cases,
as we adopt the auto-exposure setting for cameras, the
stripe patterns appeared on two different face images may
be different in terms of intensity, width and color during
capturing, which further leads to attack success rates drop.
Impact of Distance: We further vary the distance rang-
ing in {0.5m, 1m, 1.5m} between the camera and the LED.
The attack success rate based on Huawei Mate30Pro and
SphereFace model also drops. For example, the attack success
rate is 20% when the distance is 1m, and the attack fails
when the distance is 1.5m based on our setting, which is
reasonable as we empirically find that the intensity of stripe
pattern becomes lower at longer distance. Nevertheless, the
attacker may consider to further increase the power of LED
with stronger illumination, adjust the distance between the
LED and camera, or adopt multiple LEDs to achieve higher
attack success rate.
VIII. DEFENSE
In this section, we explore and evaluate some potential
defense strategies against our proposed attack. In particular,
we consider neural cleanse [20] and l∞-based network pruning
[21] for backdoor mitigation by evaluating the defense on
PubFig dataset based on face recognition task, as both [20] and
[21] require target label information. We also consider image
denoising method by assuming we have the prior knowledge
of trigger pattern and evaluate such strategy on both face
recognition and verification task.
A. Backdoor Mitigation
We first analyze two universal backdoor mitigation algo-
rithms, namely neural cleanse [20] and l∞-based network
pruning [21]. For neural cleanse, the key idea is to conduct
reverse engineering based on DNN to obtain possible triggers
and further apply mitigation techniques to remove the triggers
while the model performance is still preserved. We visualize
some trigger samples obtained by neural cleanse in Fig. 11
and the defense results are shown in Table V. Based on
the results, we observe that the visualization of reserved
engineering triggers are quite different compared with our
proposed triggers based on visual similarity. We can also
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 11. The trigger examples generated by the reverse engineer from Neural
Cleanse [20]. (a): monochromatic mask in PubFig (b): monochromatic pattern
in PubFig (c): color mask in PubFig (d): color pattern in PubFig
TABLE V
THE RESULTS OF DEFENSE BY USING NEURAL CLEANSE.
Pattern Before Patchingnon-victim test accuracy attack success rate
Mono 0.9403±0.0021 0.7659±0.0532
Color 0.9443±0.0012 0.8856±0.0416
Patching with Reversed Trigger
non-victim test accuracy attack success rate
Mono 0.9305±0.0019 0.5301±0.0571
Color 0.9390±0.0013 0.7903±0.0392
observe from Table V that while the attack success rate drops
after conducting neural cleanse, it is still relatively high.
On the other hand, it has been found that the images with
triggers will result in significant increase of the l∞ norm
in the Grad-CAM [50] of the final convolution layer [21].
To this end, a l∞ norm based network pruning strategy was
proposed to remove the neurons with high activation values
which exceed a specific threshold to prevent the model from
responding to the trigger. Noted that it might be difficult to
manually select the pruning threshold, we therefore follow [21]
by choosing the max value to the clean images’ activation
value with the correct label in the training set as the initial
threshold and further adjust the threshold by a scaling factor
“ratio”. The results are shown in Fig. 12.
By training on PubFig dataset, the initial threshold is about
46.39 where ratio = 1, and we find that high attack success
rate based on the trigger with both monochromatic stripe
pattern and color pattern can be achieved. When a small
pruning threshold is adopted by lowering the ratio, we can
observe the attack success rate can be decreased. However,
we also observe that non-victim test accuracy also decreases,
which indicates that such defense strategy may have a negative
impact to the normal recognition function. Nevertheless, we
observe that for PubFig dataset, we can achieve a tradeoff
by selecting ratio = 0.4, where attack success rate becomes
lower to around 0.75 and 0.8 for monochromatic stripe pattern
and color stripe pattern, respectively. Such attack success rate
is still very high.
B. Image Denoising through Destripeping
We then assume that we have the prior knowledge of
the triggers, which is the stripe pattern. We use this prior
knowledge to build a filter that can detect and pre-process
the poisoning samples that lead to malicious behavior.
One may consider to filter out backdoor through stripe
pattern detection. However, we argue that it may not be
user friendly. In practice, the widely used fluorescent bulbs,
which are driven by alternating current (AC) frequency, may
also lead to stripe patterns on images captured by cameras
without the aliasing module. Directly filtering out images with
stripe patterns may affect normal face recognition/verification
process.
To this end, we conduct image denosing, which is quite
common in the community of machine learning security to
remove malicious samples (e.g., [10]). To be more specific, as
we have the prior knowledge the trigger, we conduct image
destripeping to mitigate the impact of stripe pattern which
leads to DNN malicious behavior. We adopt the recently
proposed destripeping method proposed in [22] to conduct the
image processing on detected poisoning samples. We show
some of the example images after destripeping in Fig. 13
and the results are shown in Table VI based on both face
recognition task on PubFig dataset and face verification task on
LFW dataset by considering monochromatic and color stripe
pattern.
As we can see from Table VI, image destripeping can have
impact on both victim success rate and attack success rate.
While attack success rate drops for both face recognition and
verification task, it is still considered to be relatively high. One
reason is that the stripe pattern may not be able to fully filtered
through image destripeping, as shown in Fig. 13. Meanwhile,
we observe that the victim success rate also drops, which is
reasonable as image destripeping may remove some texture
patterns which have negative effect on the DNN prediction of
face recognition/verification.
In summary, we have shown that the stripe pattern de-
tection/destripeping could be useful in our attack. However,
similar to the existing research on adversarial examples (e.g.,
adversarial retraining or adversarial sample detection), it is still
a challenge to propose more robust defense techniques on this
attack without affecting the normal recognition/verification.
This work pinpoints a novel and practical backdoor attack,
which calls for more attention on face recognition/verification
tasks and more robust defense methods on such practical
backdoor attack.
IX. RELATED WORKS
A. Other Backdoor Attacks
Besides the attacks mentioned in Section II.B, there exists
literatures which conduct backdoor attack based on a specific
task. For example, Zhao et al. [51] proposed to generate
and enhance backdoor trigger for video classification task.
There also exists literatures which analyze the transfablity of
backdoor attack. For example, Wang et al. [52] proposed to
evaluate the practicality of misclassification attacks against
student models in different applications. Zhu et al. [53]
proposed a novel “polytope attack” objective in multiple layers
to generate poisoning samples with Dropout regularization.
Desired transferability can be achieved even without accessing
the target DNN model. Clements et al. [54] and Zhao et al.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 12. The results of defense by using l∞ norm based network pruning on PubFig dataset. (a): attack successful rate on monochromatic stripe pattern with
different ratio. (b): non-victim test accuracy with on monochromatic stripe pattern with different ratio. (c): attack successful rate on color stripe pattern with
different ratio. (d): non-victim test accuracy with on color stripe pattern with different ratio.
TABLE VI
THE RESULTS OF DEFENSE BY USING IMAGE DESTRIPEPING
Face Recognition
Victim Success Rate Attack Success Rate
Mono 0.8933 0.2554
Color 0.9002 0.7976
Face Verification
Victim Success Rate Attack Success Rate
Mono 0.8355 0.1811
Color 0.8882 0.5278
[55] further extended the idea of backdoor attack by proposing
a hardware implementation. Li et al. [56] proposed a specific
hardware-software collaborative attack framework to inject
backdoor to DNN model. Tang et al. proposed to inject an
auxiliary “Trojan Net” to the target model for backdoor attack.
More recently, Xie et al. [57] proposed to extend backdoor
attack into a distributed setting for federated learning task.
Apart from the defenses discussed in Section II.B, Xiang
et al. [58] proposed a cluster impurity based scheme to
detect the backdoors. Tran et al. [59] proposed to explore the
spetral signature of poisoning samples for defense purpose.
Bagdasaryan et al. [60] proposed a novel objective based on
constrain-and-scale technique by considering the evasion of
defenses for federated learning. Aiken et al. [61] proposed
a neural network “laundering” technique for backdoor wa-
termark removal. Doan et al. [62] proposed a plug-and-play
defensive stragety for backdoor defense.
B. Adversarial Attacks
Our proposed method is closely related to adversarial per-
turbation examples [63], which are very similar to the benign
samples but can mislead the DNN models to produce different
prediction outputs. Generally, the techniques of adversarial
perturbation examples generation can be categorized into two
streams: gradient ascend attack [63], [64], [65], [66], [67] by
modifying input data with norm regularization, and generative
adversarial network attack to generate adversarial samples
through a DNN with the input as benign sample [68]. Such
attack has been extended to physical domain attack [7], [69]
by generating an adversarial pattern which can be printed
out in a special shape (e.g., eyeglasses for face recognition
system). Besides, researchers also aimed to explore other
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 13. The examples through destripeping [22]. (a): clean image (b):
monochromatic stripe image (c): monochromatic stripe image with de-
stripeping (d): color stripe image (e): color stripe image with destripeping
adversarial patterns which can be physically launched (e.g.,
infrared mask [70], visible light projected pattern [71]) in a
white-box manner. However, the aforementioned techniques
may be rejected by face anti-spoofing techniques [72], [73],
which aim to analysis the inconsistency between real faces
and faces for attacking purpose. In addition, motivated by the
traditional software testing, some testing techniques [74], [75],
[76] have been proposed to generate adversarial examples by
maximizing the coverage of the DNN model.
C. LED-to-Camera Communication
Our work is also closely related to LED-to-camera com-
munication, which aims at data delivering between LED light
source and capturing device through rolling shutter mecha-
nism. In [17], the authors proposed to use ON-OFF keying
(OOK) to ensure reliable data communication. To further
achieve high data rate of communication and its robustness
under severe noisy environment, different types of modulations
have been explored, such as Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
[77], Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) [78], and Color Shift
Keying (CSK) [79]. To further improve the data rate, multi-
input multi-output (MIMO) techniques have also been explore
[80], [81]. Our proposed technique can be treated as another
application in the field of AI security based on LED-to-Camera
communication. Besides security, similar machenism has also
been explored in different types of scenarios (e.g., Internet of
Things (IoT) [82], capturing-resistant technologies [43]).
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new black-box backdoor attack
against DNN on face recognition systems. While the mech-
anism of our proposed attack framework is similar to the
existing backdoor attacks, our proposed attack can be launched
in a more practical way. We propose to inject poisoning
samples into the database with flickering LED light source by
leveraging the rolling shutter mechanism of capturing devices,
such that the color stripe pattern can be automatically injected
into the database as hidden trigger during data collection phase
without the awareness of victims.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of practicality of our
proposed attack through experiments in both simulation and
physical domain based on the state-of-the-art DNN model
as well as the commercial systems. The experimental results
suggest that our attack is real and can be launched physically
with high attack success rate. Our findings real the security
issues of DNN in the community of face analysis and we
hope our attack brings additional attention on such issues.
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APPENDIX
A. Details of VGGFace Model Optimization
To fine-tune the VGGFace model [16], we set the batch
size as 128, the learning rate with 0.0001 with weight decay
as 0.0005. We use the Adam algorithm for optimization, where
the number of training epochs is set as 100. The classification
accuracy is 0.9428 and 0.9870 on the clean data of PubFig
and Youtube Face dataset, respectively.
B. Impact of LED Frequency and Duty Cycle on Face Recog-
nition Task
In this section, we evaluate the LED setting by analyzing the
impact of LED frequency and duty cycle on face recognition
Task. Noted that for face recognition task, we are able to
fine-tune the network based on the trigger samples, which is
different from the setting of face verification task. Following
the experimental analysis in Section VI, we fix the frequency
or duty cycle by setting other parameters obtained through
evolutionary computing. We first discuss the performance by
varying frequency, where the results are shown in Table VII.
Similar to the observation in Section VI, the attack success
rates drop by varying the frequency, which is reasonable as
LED frequency is one of the important components to model
the stripe pattern, which can have huge impact on the final
performance. Nevertheless, the attack success rates are still
satisfactory with high face detection success rates and victim
success rates. We then discuss the impact of duty cycle, where
the results are shown in Fig. 14. As we can observe, we can
draw a similar conclusion as verification task despite the fact
that the DNN model will be fine-tuned with injected poisoning
samples, which is that, the attack performance degrades when
either duty cycle is too high or too low as it can influence the
quality of captured face images.
C. Impact of Number of poisoning Samples for Face Recog-
nition Task
In our face recognition experiment in Section VI, we fix the
number of poisoning samples as 20 for both PubFig dataset
and Youtube Face dataset. In this section, we are interested
in the impact of number of poisoning samples injected into
the database. The results are presented in Fig. 15. We can
draw a similar conclusion compared with the observation in
[7], [8] that by injecting more poisoning samples, we can
achieve better attack success rates. We find that a relatively
stable attack success rates can be achieved when the number
of poisoning samples is larger than 20 for both PubFig and
YouTube Face dataset, which corresponds to modulate LED
for around 1 second given the frame rate as 25Hz.
D. Physical Implementation based on Household LED
We use a step-down DC-DC module to provide power
for the Micro-Control Unit (MCU) and other peripherals.
The input of the step-down switching regulator comes from
the LED power supply, thus we can hide the system into a
household LED device. More specifically, we adopt MP1584
which is a high frequency step-down switching regulator with
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Fig. 14. The impact of duty circle on attack success rate of face recognition
task.
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Fig. 15. Attack success rates by considering different number of poisoning
samples.
an integrated internal high-side high voltage power MOSFET.
The input voltage ranges from 4.5V to 28V which accommo-
dates a wide variety of LED supplies. the output voltage can
be adjusted from 0.8V to 25V.
To further modulate LED’s ON-OFF keying, we use a Power
MOSFET to control the power supply directly connected to
the LED. Power MOSFET has a fast switching speed and has a
high current capacity. We use IRF3205 to drive the high-power
LED. The OOK signal is produced by an Arduino which is a
low-cost micro-controller unit. Thus, our implemented system
with LED bulb consumes approximately 30W peak power,
which is sufficient for an attacker to conduct attack in the
office environment under normal light condition.
In addition, a Bluetooth module HC05 is adopted and
the I/O pin of Arduino with TTL logic level is directly
connected to the gate pin of IRF3205 due to the acceptable
low on-resistance, such that an attack can remotely control the
LED modulation and configuration without the awareness of
victims.
E. Synchronization of Registration and Attack
While we can model the intensity, width as well as color in-
formation of stripe pattern, the location of the pattern is beyond
the control of an attacker, which is due to the synchronization
of LED flickering between face registration and attack (see
Fig. 9 for example). Intuitively, if the position of the stripes
on the two faces are similar, the face pair should have a higher
(a) Evaluation Result of VGGFace on PubFig Dataset
freq (hz) non-victim test accuracy face detection success rate victim success rate attack success rate
50 0.9403±0.0021 0.7640±0.0098 0.920±0.0781 0.4398±0.0832
60 0.9411±0.0016 0.7800±0.0041 0.925±0.0602 0.5599±0.0972
110 0.9411±0.0023 0.8280±0.0028 0.850±0.1140 0.8070±0.0428
220 0.9415±0.0018 0.9950±0.0005 0.945±0.0415 0.0648±0.0405
330 0.9409±0.0023 0.9767±0.0012 0.920±0.0812 0.5982±0.0736
(b) Evaluation Result of VGGFace on YouTube Face Dataset
freq (hz) non-victim test accuracy face detection success rate victim success rate attack success rate
50 0.9863±0.0008 0.8003±0.0037 0.975±0.0433 0.0896±0.0439
60 0.9851±0.0005 0.7703±0.0062 0.963±0.0650 0.2848±0.0924
110 0.9862±0.0014 0.6580±0.0088 0.950±0.0707 0.5704±0.0766
220 0.9856±0.0003 0.9967±0.0005 1.000±0.0000 0.0561±0.0114
330 0.9854±0.0007 0.9437±0.0049 0.963±0.0415 0.5891±0.0550
TABLE VII
THE IMPACT OF FREQUENCY ON ATTACK SUCCESS RATE OF FACE RECOGNITION TASK
High Power
LED
IRF3205
Q1
LED Driver
MP1584
IN+
IN-
IN-
OUT+
OUT+
OUT-
OUT-
IN+
VCC
GND
HC05 VCC
MCU VCC
OOK Input(From MCU)
(a) Simplified circuit (b) Physical im-
plementation
Fig. 16. Implementation based on household LED light.
similarity score. However, in practice, it is highly likely there
exists “phase shift” between the face images for registration
and attack purpose. To better understand how synchronization
issue influences the final performance, we conduct experiment
by varying the phase difference between the registration and
attack face images on LFW dataset. We report the mean
and standard deviation of cosine similarity of images which
belong to two different identities. The results are shown in
Fig. 17, where T denotes the period of LED flickering. As
we can observe, two faces images are more similar when
there is no phase difference between them, and the similarity
drops when phase difference becomes larger. As an attacker
cannot control the phase difference, we therefore recommend
to conduct multiple trials, which is allowed by off-the-shelf
face recognition systems.
MONO_mean
MONO_std
COLOR_std
COLOR_mean
Fig. 17. The impact of phase difference on cosine similarity.
F. LED Phase Shift
We are also interested in the phase shift among different
LED sources. To this end, we conduct experiments by varying
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Fig. 18. The impact of phase shift on attack success rate.
the phase shift of φ(R,G) and φ(R,B) in terms of channel
R. As we can observe from Fig. 18, the performance vary
by choosing different phase shift, which shows that the DNN
model for face analysis can be impacted by color information.
Nevertheless, we find that our proposed attack strategy can
achieve significantly better performance by randomly selecting
color combination in general, which further indicates the
effectiveness of our proposed attack framework.
G. Impact of the stripe Direction
While in the previous study we assume that stripe patterns
are generated in a column-wise manner, it may not always be
true due to the orientation of camera as well as the design of
CMOS sensor. To this end, we discuss the impact of stripe
direction by further considering stripe patterns generated in a
row-wise manner, where the parameters are optimized based
on CMA-ES. The results are shown in Fig. 19. Surprisingly,
we find that better attack performance can be achieved by
injecting horizontal stripe pattern. We conjecture the reason
may due to the structural symmetry of human face, such that
the DNN model preserve more horizontal information.
H. Quality of Face Images
We finally discuss the quality of captured face images
with stripe patterns. Noted that different APIs may adopt
different metrics, such that the evaluation can be different.
Besides directly measuring the quality based on whether the
face region can be detected or not, we also consider to use
the quality metrics adopted by Baidu API, which mainly
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Fig. 19. The impact of stripe direction on ROC curve.
TABLE VIII
FACE IMAGE QUALITY BASED ON BAIDU API.
Evaluation index score recommended threshold
occulusion
left eye 0.06 <0.6
right eye 0.15 <0.6
nose 0.19 <0.7
mouth 0.16 <0.7
left cheek 0.11 <0.8
right cheek 0.26 <0.8
chin contour 0.21 <0.6
blur 0.08 <0.7
illumination 124 >40
evaluates the quality from three different perspectives, namely
occlusion, blur and illumination. We use the LFW dataset by
modeling the stripe patterns based on the parameters through
evolutionary computing. We list the averaging score obtained
through Baidu API as well as its recommended threshold in
Table VIII. As we can see, our proposed backdoor trigger will
not impact the quality, which guarantees reliable face detection
rate.
